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Resumo
As smart grids resultaram da integrac¸a˜o da rede ele´trica atual no mundo digital. Isso
traz va´rias vantagens a`s redes ele´tricas, como uma instalac¸a˜o, configurac¸a˜o e manutenc¸a˜o
mais simples e eficiente, mas tambe´m a fa´cil integrac¸a˜o na rede de novas tecnologias. En-
quanto as redes ele´tricas continuam a crescer em dimensa˜o e complexidade, elas tornam-
se mais importantes para a sociedade e subsequentemente mais sujeitas a ataques distin-
tos. Alguns dos objetivos mais importantes da smart grid sa˜o: acomodar uma grande
variedade de tecnologias de produc¸a˜o de eletricidade como a eo´lica, solar e geote´rmica;
ser resiliente a ataques fı´sicos e ciber-ataques; ter mecanismos de detec¸a˜o, ana´lise e res-
posta automa´tica a incidentes; dar mais poder ao consumidor final sobre como e quando
a energia pode ser comprada ou consumida.
Para implementar actividades relacionadas com a monitorizac¸a˜o do estado da smart
grid, va´rios componentes especializados sa˜o geograficamente distribuı´dos pela rede. Um
dos dispositivos crı´ticos e´ o Phase Measurement Unit (Unidade de Medic¸a˜o de Fase)
(PMU). Este dispositivo e´ usado para estimar o estado da smart grid num determinado
momento, recolhendo va´rias me´tricas sobre a qualidade do sinal ele´trico. Para se con-
seguir criar uma imagem geral da rede inteira, todos estes dispositivos necessitam de ser
sincronizados no tempo, assegurando assim que as medic¸o˜es sa˜o efetuadas aproximada-
mente no mesmo instante.
A sincronizac¸a˜o do tempo desempenha um papel crucial na estabilidade e no fun-
cionamento correto de todos os componentes da smart grid. Dada a importaˆncia da
sincronizac¸a˜o de tempo, e a falta de qualquer tipo de protec¸a˜o nas soluc¸o˜es atuais, este
sistema torna-se num alvo potencial para atacantes.
Em conformidade com os standards, a precisa˜o dos relo´gios dos PMU’s devem ter um
erro ma´ximo na ordem dos 30 µs. Isso garante que a informac¸a˜o recolhida sobre o estado
da smart grid e´ va´lida. Hoje em dia este requisito e´ satisfeito usando equipamentos GPS
em cada sı´tio onde se encontra um PMU. Quando o GPS foi concebido, na˜o se pensou que
podia vir a ter o sucesso e o impacto atual e, portanto, assegurar a sua seguranc¸a na˜o foi
um ponto importante. Ao longo do tempo passou a ser usado em infraestruturas crı´ticas,
o que introduz eventuais problemas graves de seguranc¸a. As smart grids sa˜o uma destas
estruturas crı´ticas onde o GPS esta´ a ser usado sem qualquer tipo de protec¸a˜o. Atualmente
existe tambe´m uma versa˜o segura do GPS que e´ empregue pelas forc¸as militares. Os
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dispositivos que conseguem decifrar este sinal so´ esta˜o disponı´veis ao exe´rcito. Por ale´m
disso, todos os detalhes sobre o funcionamento do algoritmo de cifra sa˜o mantidos em
segredo.
Ao longo dos anos foram desenvolvidos va´rios tipos de ataques ao GPS. O mais
ba´sico e´ o Blocking que consiste simplesmente em impedir a comunicac¸a˜o entre a antena
do recetor e o sinal GPS. Isso pode ser conseguido de uma maneira ta˜o simples como
tapar a antena com um bocado de metal. Um ataque que tenta tambe´m quebrar a ligac¸a˜o
com o sate´lite e´ o Jamming. A ideia deste ataque e´ introduzir ruı´do suficiente para que o
recetor na˜o consiga distinguir o sinal original. Estes dois tipos de ataques so´ conseguem
perturbar o funcionamento do recetor GPS. Um tipo de ataque mais potente e´ o Spoofing.
Este ataque consegue modificar o sinal original vindo do sate´lite de forma a enganar o
recetor. Assim e´ possı´vel fazer com que o recetor GPS mostre uma posic¸a˜o ou tempo
incorretos. Nesta dissertac¸a˜o tambe´m foi analisada uma evoluc¸a˜o deste ataque que tem
como alvo a alterac¸a˜o ilegı´tima dos dados contidos no sinal. Isso pode fazer como que o
recetor falhe ou deixe de poder ser usado.
Os algoritmos de sincronizac¸a˜o de relo´gios existentes hoje em dia, nomeadamente o
Network Time Protocol (NTP) e o Precision Time Protocol (PTP), na˜o sa˜o suficientemente
robustos, em termos de seguranc¸a ou precisa˜o, para serem utilizados na smart grid. O
NTP foi concebido para a sincronizac¸a˜o de relo´gios em redes de grande escala mas na˜o
consegue fornecer a precisa˜o necessa´ria para os requisitos da smart grid. Por outro lado
temos o PTP que consegue atingir uma precisa˜o na ordem dos nanosegundos em certas
condic¸o˜es, mas e´ muito sensı´vel a atrasos e oscilac¸o˜es na rede. Isso faz com que o PTP so´
consiga garantir uma precisa˜o de tempo na ordem dos nanosegundos em redes de pequena
escala. A smart grid usa uma rede de alta velocidade com relativamente pouco tra´fego,
o que torna o PTP uma possı´vel soluc¸a˜o para algumas partes dessa rede. Em termos de
seguranc¸a, o PTP na˜o esta´ preparado para ser utilizado num ambiente ta˜o crı´tico como a
smart grid, sendo suscetı´vel a ataques.
O foco desta investigac¸a˜o e´ encontrar um algoritmo resiliente a faltas, capaz de satis-
fazer os requisitos de sincronizac¸a˜o de tempo necessa´rios para o correto funcionamento
da smart grid. Foi desenvolvida uma soluc¸a˜o baseada no PTP, que consegue cumprir os
requisitos de precisa˜o temporal na smart grid e tambe´m consegue mitigar todos os tipos
de ataques ao GPS que foram identificados. Para ale´m disso, a soluc¸a˜o tambe´m permite
reduzir o nu´mero de recetores de GPS necessa´rios para o funcionamento correto da smart
grid.
Palavras-chave: Smart Grid, GPS, Sincronizac¸a˜o de relogios, Seguranc¸a
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Abstract
Smart grids resulted from the integration of computer technologies into the current
power grid. This brings several advantages, allowing for a faster and more efficient
deployment, configuration and maintenance, as well as easy integration of new energy
sources (e.g., wind and solar). As smart grids continue to grow in size and complexity,
they become subject to failures and attacks from different sources. Time synchroniza-
tion plays a crucial role in the stability and correct functioning of many grid components.
Considering how sensitive time synchronization is, the tight restrictions imposed for cor-
rect operation and the lack of any kind of protection, makes this service a potential prime
target for attackers. Today most of the time synchronization requirements are met using
relatively expensive GPS hardware placed in some locations of the smart grid. When GPS
was first devised, nobody could have predicted the success and the impact that it would
have and therefore, security was never an important concern. Through the years, it slowly
gained entrance into more critical systems, where it was never intended to be used, which
can lead to serious security problems. The smart grid is just one of these critical systems
where GPS is being employed without any kind of protection. The focus of this research
is trying to solve this problem, by proposing a more secure and robust clock synchroniza-
tion algorithm. A solution based on the Precision Time Protocol (PTP) was developed
that manages to fulfill the time synchronization requirements of the smart grid and is also
capable of mitigating all types of identified GPS attacks. As an added benefit, the solution
may also reduce the number of GPS receivers necessary for the correct operation of the
smart grid, contributing to decrease costs.
Keywords: Smart Grid, GPS, Time synchronization, Security
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The smart grid represents the evolution and integration into the digital world of the current
electrical grid. Information technologies are used to improve the way the electric genera-
tion and distribution is currently done, making it more efficient, reliable and sustainable.
The smart grid will support better automation, management and coordination between the
end-user and the producer. Advantages include advanced monitoring that can accurately
identify and take measures to mitigate failures and attacks. Self-healing technologies can
be implemented that will allow the grid to solve problems without the need for on-site
verifications or any kind of human intervention.
This increase in interaction between production and consumption, as well as the
sheer complexity demanded by such a network, leads to a set of new challenges and
security problems. User privacy becomes a real concern because of the increase in the
data collection and processing. Reliable communication among the various parts of the
electrical infrastructure turns into a critical necessity.
Smart grids are composed of different types of components each with its own re-
quirements. One such component is the Phase Measurement Unit (PMU), which is an
advanced measurement device used to obtain status information about the electrical lines.
It is one of the building blocks of a monitoring system that can analyze the state of the
grid in real-time. In particular, a PMU keeps track of various parameters (e.g., electrical
current amplitude and phase) of the part of the smart grid where it is installed. This can
be thought of as a ”snapshot” of the state in which that portion of the smart grid is in.
The deployment of multiple PMU’s at different locations across the network allows for
a complete state estimation. This information can then be used to support decisions on
the need to modify the power generation or the distribution of loads, which in turn gives
1
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the ability to predict and avoid failures like blackouts. Time synchronization among all
PMU’s is critical to create a coherent picture of the smart grid. If PMU’s take ”snapshots”
at different times, the complete state cannot be correctly estimated.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is used to synchronize the clocks of the PMU’s
around the network [2]. GPS is a type of satellite based clock synchronization solution.
It is able to provide time reference with sufficient accuracy and availability to be used
in infrastructures and systems where time synchronization is critical. When it was first
designed, security was not a concern. However, as it grew in popularity, this lack of
security became a more troubling concern.
One way to try to address the lack of security of GPS is to use a Software Defined
Radio (SDR) [3] capable receiver and modify it in such a way to make it more resilient to
attacks. SDR as a concept has been around for some years now, but recently has experi-
enced a rapid evolution, taking advantage of the newer capabilities of digital electronics.
SDR allows for a software implementation of several components that traditionally were
only possible in hardware, like radio filters, modulators/demodulators and detectors. This
not only reduces costs and increases ease of use, but can also create better open source
alternatives to current offerings. Even a full GPS receiver can be implemented in soft-
ware [4] [Figure 1.1]. This would allow for the addition of features to the standard GPS
protocol to make it more secure and suitable for use in smart grids.
PC running GNSS SDR SDR Dongle GPS Antenna 
Figure 1.1: SDR based GPS receiver.
Another approach to improve security takes advantage of alternative network time
synchronization mechanisms. These solutions are advancing at a fast pace and they are
currently being studied as a means to synchronize clocks in critical infrastructures, like
the electrical grid [5]. Several synchronization systems exist, differing from each other
in terms of features, complexity and performance. Today, the most common time syn-
chronization algorithms are the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [6] and the Precision Time
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Protocol (PTP) [7].
NTP is a network protocol employed to synchronize system clocks among a set of
distributed time servers and clients. Since its first appearance in 1985, four versions were
released, with the last one being NTPv4 in 2010 [8]. NTPv4 addresses many of NTPv3’s
shortcomings, and it can achieve an accuracy of a few milliseconds over the internet,
while coping relatively well with variable message delays and dropped packets. It uses a
client-server model [see Figure 1.2] with participants organized into different levels called
Stratum. Each stratum has a number (starting from 0 at the highest level) representing its
distance from the reference clock. The largest stratum level is 15. After this level all
nodes are considered desynchronized. Note that even though it seems logical that higher-
level clocks have better accuracy, this is not always true because the stratum level can be
user-defined and as such it does not always reflect the clock quality.
Stratum 2
Stratum 1
Stratum 0
Figure 1.2: Simple NTP Network.
PTP is currently the most accurate network time synchronization protocol available,
with an accuracy that can reach nanosecond precision. It makes use of a hierarchical
master-slave architecture to synchronize clocks in a network. Different roles are defined
for every clock/node but also to each communication link between them. Special mes-
sages that carry very accurate timestamps are exchanged between nodes. In order to reach
such high levels of synchronization special care needs to be taken with these timestamps.
Even the delays introduced by the packet traversing the Operating System (OS) proto-
col stack can have a big impact on the outcome. To address these difficulties, PTP de-
fines three modes of operation: software-only, hardware-assisted and hardware only. The
software-only is the least precise approach because all timestamps are taken at the applica-
tion level of the protocol stack. On the other hand, hardware-assisted and hardware-only
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modes use special hardware to timestamp the messages as close to the physical layer as
possible. The difference between these two modes is related to the place where the PTP
implementation actually runs - in software for the hardware-assisted mode and in hard-
ware for the hardware-only mode.
1.1 Requirements
The requirements of a time synchronization protocol suitable for use in smart grids are
explained in detail in the standard C37.118-2011 [9]. The standard is split into two parts:
the first one presents the measurement (called phasor in this context) estimation require-
ments while the second one explains the network communication protocol. The time
synchronization requirements are described as the maximum allowed error for PMU’s.
Called the Total Vector Error (TVE), it represents the vectorial difference between the
estimated and the theoretical phasors in percentages. The requirement imposed by the
standard is a maximum of 1% TVE, which equates to approximately 30µs. Even though
the standard does not talk about security requirements, the protocol needs to be relatively
secure and maintain timing errors below the thresholds. Ideally, this should occur even in
extreme situations, such as in the case of an attack or when fault tolerance mechanisms
need to do recovery. The fact that each PMU is equipped with a GPS receiver means that
it also inherits all the insecurity and problems related to GPS, which in turn makes the
implementation of a secure time synchronization algorithm even more challenging.
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis we propose an alternative way of keeping the PMU’s synchronized by resort-
ing to a modified version of the PTP protocol. In failure/attack free intervals, the PMU’s
continue to employ GPS based clock synchronization. When a problem is detected they
switch to our protocol.
The changes to PTP were designed with the following two goals:
• the first aim was to create a protocol that manages to satisfy the time synchroniza-
tion requirements of the smart grid, while also being able to cope with the attacks
and failures that might happen around the network;
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• as a second objective, we wanted to minimize the changes to the PTP standard, as
this facilitates the updates to the existing implementations and the security evalua-
tion.
Most security problems related to PTP are analyzed in some detail in the thesis.
There is however a focus on a critical attack vector, namely the GPS receiver, because it
functions as the time source for the network devices. As a result of this work, a publication
was accepted in the security track of the INFORUM conference.
R. Onica, N. Neves, and A. Casimiro, “Fault-Tolerant Precision Time Protocol for
Smart Grids,” in Proceedings of 7o Simpo´sio Nacional de Informa´tica INFORUM, Septem-
ber 2015
1.3 Timeline
The initial work plan for the thesis is presented as a Gantt chart in [Figure 1.3]. All work
tasks are described by their respective ID’s (first column of the chart).
ID Start Finish Duration
Q4 14 Q2 15Q1 15
Dec JunMarOct Jan Apr MayNov Feb
1 39d11/28/201407‐10‐2014
2 25d11/28/201427‐10‐2014
3 40d12/26/201403‐11‐2014
4 40d1/30/201508‐12‐2014
5 75d5/1/201519‐01‐2015
6 104d7/7/201512‐02‐2015
Figure 1.3: Gantt chart representing the initial thesis work plan.
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• Task 1 consists of the study of current GPS and network time synchronization algo-
rithms, with a focus being put on their security, or lack thereof. The NTP and PTP
protocol were studied and possible solutions to their respective security problems
were researched. The environment in which these protocols would need to work,
namely the smart grids, was analyzed to better understand the exact requirements;
• Task 2 is the design of an approach that could eliminate (or at least diminish) the
impact of possible attacks on the time synchronization. The first approach we came
up with was based on using SDR to add security features to the current GPS proto-
col;
• Task 3 is the analysis of all available hardware and software solutions to select the
ones that would allow for the creation of a framework and workbench to be used
for implementing, testing and assessing our proposed approach;
• Task 4 consists of building the framework and workbench with the selected hard-
ware and software;
• Task 5 is the implementation of the approach and the assessment of its effective-
ness. The implementation should be tested against attacks that could happen in
the context of a smart grid. The results should be analyzed and compared with the
initial requirements;
• Task 6 is to further analyze how the solution performs and to document the results.
The initial approach was based on using SDR along with specific hardware to try to
add protection mechanisms to the standard GPS protocol. SDR is responsible for creating
the navigation and time solutions from the RAW GPS data that the hardware provides.
However, once we reached Task 4, we encountered several compatibility issues with the
hardware that lead to unexpected delays in the work plan. When all compatibility issues
were resolved, we already had a working prototype of the software that could be tested.
At that time, we ran into a second difficulty - the hardware was unable to capture any kind
of GPS data.
The problem appeared to be with the SDR dongle or with the antenna - either our
SDR dongle was faulty and could not read any kind of GPS data or the antenna was not
sufficiently powerful to capture the satellite signal. The dongle managed to collect radio
waves in the normal frequency spectrum (like radio stations), which we could decode,
but could not receive any kind of signal in the 1575 MHz range that the GPS uses. This
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led us to think that the problem was with the antenna. To try to find a solution, we
experimented with another antenna of a higher quality and additional hardware, namely
a bias-T network to power the new antenna. Even so, we had no success at receiving any
kind of GPS signal.
This led us to try a different approach. This was the solution that we ended up
implementing and testing. It is based on the PTP, and due to time constraints, we decided
to employ a software-only version based on the open-source project ptpd2 [10]. Setting
up this solution only required a few Linux PC’s and an additional Ethernet card. The first
stage was to design the solution to the smallest detail. The next step was to set up the
workbench and install the ptpd2 software. After this, the modifications to the standard
protocol were implemented and tested.
ID Start Finish Duration
Q4 14 Q2 15Q1 15
Dec JunMarOct Jan Apr MayNov Feb
1 39d11/28/201410/7/2014
2 25d11/28/201410/27/2014
3 40d12/26/201411/3/2014
4 40d1/30/201512/8/2014
5 30d2/27/20151/19/2015
24d4/2/20153/2/20156
68d7/7/20154/3/20157
68d7/7/20154/3/20158
Figure 1.4: Gantt chart representing the final thesis work plan.
The new Gantt chart representing the final work plan for the thesis is shown in [Fig-
ure 1.4]. Up to Task 4 the plan stayed the same but, the final stages of the work had to be
revised:
• Task 5 represents a new research stage in which a different approach was studied
to try to adapt the PTP standard in such a way to be used in smart grids;
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• Task 6 corresponds to the design of a new solution that is suited for use in smart
grids and can satisfy all the requirements. This task also includes building the
workbench for implementing and testing the protocol;
• Task 7 represents the implementation of the newly designed solution. The imple-
mentation is an extension to the PTP standard programmed in the ptpd2 software;
• Task 8 is the testing phase and also contains the documentation of all the work up
until this point.
1.4 Thesis outline
In chapter 2, the concept of smart grid is introduced alongside the best time synchro-
nization protocols, GPS and PTP. In particular, it explains why the PMU’s deployed in
smart grids need to be time synchronized. After explaining the basics about how GPS
and PTP work, the chapter discusses several issues that these protocols have, mainly con-
cerning their security. For PTP, the major problems in terms of time synchronization are
described, namely clock offset and delay asymmetry.
Chapter 3 of the thesis is dedicated to give an in depth explanation of the proposed
solution the implementation. After presenting the reasoning behind some of the security
related decisions, the attack model explains the capabilities of the adversary. All the
changes made to the PTP standard are explained next. The last part of this chapter is
dedicated to explaining the details of implementing the attack detection mechanisms using
the software of ptpd2.
Chapter 4 presents the tests and experimental results of the work. A detailed explana-
tion is given about the testing platform. The implications and effects of using the existing
hardware as the test bed are analyzed and various types of attacks are conducted. The
result shows the effectiveness of the proposed solution, making it a suitable candidate for
the smart grid time synchronization.
Chapter 2
Context
A thorough study of all the current time synchronization algorithms is essential to lay the
foundation for our proposed solution. Understanding the challenges imposed by the smart
grid provide motivation and give a clear explanation of what the solution is supposed to
do. In this chapter the foundation for this thesis is explained. Some related work on the
security of currently available solutions is also discussed.
2.1 The Smart Grid
The smart grid [Figure 2.1] is the next generation of the electrical power system. The
smart grid has two primary features: it allows flexible and real-time decision making
based on real time data collection and analysis; and it is capable of monitoring its own
health and alert operators immediately when problems arise. In some cases, the smart
grid may also act automatically, taking corrective actions that will minimize the impact of
a failure.
Some of the most important objectives of the smart grid are:
• Accommodate a large variety of energy production technologies including wind,
solar and geothermal heat;
• Engage the consumer not only in the consumption cycle but also in the energy
production cycle;
• Resilience to attacks, as it needs to mitigate both physical and cyber-attacks;
• Self-healing, since it needs to rapidly detect, analyze and respond to incidents;
9
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Figure 2.1: Smart grid topography [1].
• Empowering the consumer to a certain extent by allowing him to choose when/how
energy is bought;
• Accommodate for both the household consumer and industry needs.
In order to implement activities related to the smart grid monitoring, specific devices
are being placed at different geographical locations. The PMU is one such device. It is
used as a type of advanced measurement device. A PMU can collect electric metrics,
such as the voltage and current phasors at precise instants, through a timing reference
given by the Global Positioning System (GPS) [see Chapter 2.2]. This can be tough of
as a ”snapshot” of the state in which that portion of the smart grid is in. Using multiple
PMUs at different points across the smart grid allows for a complete state estimation. This
information can then be used to support decisions on the distribution of current load across
the network, which in turn gives us the ability to predict and avoid failures like blackouts.
Time synchronization among all PMUs is critical because it allows for the creation of a
coherent picture of the smart grid. If ”snapshots” are taken at different times, the complete
state cannot be correctly estimated.
Current PMUs use GPS receivers for time synchronization. This is a very costly
solution because it requires dedicated hardware to be present in each and every PMU.
From a security standpoint, it also leaves the PMUs, and in turn the whole smart grid,
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vulnerable to even the most basic GPS attacks like blocking or jamming.
2.2 Global Positioning System
GPS was developed in 1973 by the U.S. Department of Defense, as a result of combining
previous navigation systems, some of which were classified. It provides specially coded
satellite signals that can be processed in a GPS receiver, enabling it to computer its own
position, velocity and the time. Four GPS satellite signals are used to compute positions
in three dimensions and the time offset between the receiver clock and the satellite clock.
The satellites carry very stable atomic clocks that are synchronized with each other and
to ground clocks. Any drift from the true time maintained on the ground is corrected on a
daily basis.
The current GPS is composed of three major parts or segments:
• Space Segment is composed of all the GPS satellites (also called Space Vehicles).
Originally 24 satellites were used, which orbit the earth every 12 hours. They were
arranged in such a way that at least six satellites pass over the same location every
day. As of December 2012, there are a total of 32 satellites in the GPS constellation.
These additional satellites provide redundant information for the receivers, which
in turn improve the precision of the GPS receiver calculations;
• Control Segment consists of a system of tracking stations located around the world.
This system is composed of:
– a master control station (MCS);
– an alternate master control station;
– four dedicated ground antennas;
– six dedicated monitor stations.
The MCS is located in Colorado at the Schriever Air Force Base. It measures
signals from the satellites and then computer precise orbital data (called ephemeris)
and the satellite clock correction for each one. It then uploads the ephemeris and
clock data to the satellites;
• User Segment consists of all the GPS receivers both civil and military. The naviga-
tion in three dimensions is the primary function of GPS. It also allows for extremely
accurate time dissemination.
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Every GPS satellite continually broadcasts a signal that has two important compo-
nents:
• A sequence of ones and zeroes called the pseudorandom code that is known by
all GPS receivers. The receiver also has the ability of generating the exact same
pseudorandom code locally. By comparing the two codes on the time scale (local
and received codes) it can calculate the time of arrival of the original code.
• A message that includes the time of transmission of the code epoch (a defined part
of the pseudorandom code) and the satellite position at that time.
The GPS satellites transmit data on three different carrier frequencies L1, L2 and L5,
the latter only being supported on the newer satellites (at least 5 satellites where launched
from 2011, which support the L5 carrier). The data encoding is done using unique code
division multiple access (CDMA) [11], so receivers can distinguish between each satellite.
This system uses two distinct CDMA encoding types:
• a method based on a code called the course/acquisition (C/A), which is accessible
to the general public;
• a method based on a precise (P(Y)) code that is only known and used by the U.S.
military and other NATO nations. This code basically encrypts the transmitted data.
Devices capable of decrypting this signal are only available to the military and the
specifics of the security protocol are kept secret.
The GPS receiver needs to lock on to at least four satellites in order to calculate its
position (X, Y, Z) and the time (T). Each message that it receives from the satellite is time
stamped (time of transmission). It also gets the time of arrival as previously explained, so
it can calculate an estimate of the interval taken for the message to travel from the satellite
to itself. Multiplying this value by the speed of light, the GPS receiver, can determine the
distance from itself to the satellite.
Distance = ∆T ∗ speedOfLight
The time interval calculation (∆ T) is not completely precise due to the clocks of
the receiver and satellite not being perfectly synchronized (which is actually impossible
considering the atomic clocks that the satellites use). This introduces errors in the process
of calculating the exact position (trilateration). This process is shown in [Figure 2.2]. The
protocol and all messages that are used are explained in more detail in [12] and [13].
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The time calculation (ΔT) is not absolute due to the clocks of the receiver and 
satellite not being perfectly synchronized (which is actually impossible considering the 
atomic clocks that the satellites use). This introduces errors in the process of calculating 
the exact position (process called trilateration). This process is shown in Fig. 2.0. The 
protocol and all message types are explained in more detail in [2] and [3]. 
 Another factor that can contribute to the error is the atmospheric conditions, which 
can delay the messages. This leads to errors in the position calculation. Fig. 2.0 shows the 
errors introduced by these factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.0 Trilateration process used to calculate current position using GPS 
 
 
The lack of any kind of protection for the civil band means that many types of 
attacks exist to try to fool or block the GPS signal. The problem is made even worse by the 
fact the all the hardware needed for the more advanced types of attacks is readily available 
to everybody and is relatively cheap considering the circumstances. Some of the known 
attacks are described next:  
 
- Blocking consists in physically blocking the signal by shielding or removing the 
antenna of the GPS receiver; 
- Jamming overrides the original signal with a more powerful one. This is not that 
hard to do considering the fact that the parts needed for the construction of a DIY 
GPS jammer can be readily found. Another important role here is the very weak 
Figure 2.2: Trilateration process used to calculate current position using GPS.
2.2.1 GPS Attacks
The lack of any kind of protection for the civil band (the C/A code) means that many
types of attacks exist to try to f ol or bl ck the GPS signal. The problem is made even
worse y the fact that ll the hardware eeded for the more advanced typ s of attacks is
readily available to everybody and is relatively cheap considering the circumstances.
The way that the GPS signal source is transmitted also turns it into an easy target
for attacks. Because of the huge distance that the signal has to travel, its strength is very
low when it reaches the earth’s surface. It has often been compared to viewing a normal
20-Watt light bulb from about 19 000 Km away.
The next subsections discuss the most common types of GPS attacks.
GPS Blocking
GPS blocking is the most basic form of attack. This type of attack tries to isolate the
receiver from the satellite signal, which in turn leads to a signal loss. It can be performed
just by simply covering the GPS antenna of the receiver. It does however require physical
access to the GPS receiver in order to be executed which, depending on the adversary, can
create some difficulties.
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GPS Jamming
GPS jamming attacks [14] [15] are similar to blocking in the sense that they try to make
the receiver lose the signal lock. While blocking achieves this by means of isolation, the
idea behind a jamming attack is to introduce so much extra radio-frequency noise that the
receiver can no longer find the satellite signal out of it. This causes the receiver to be
unable to get a lock on the signal.
Considering how weak the satellite signal is, it is not too hard to introduce sufficient
radio-frequency noise from a few meters away from the receiver that can completely
suppress the original GPS signal. Adding to this, jamming devices are very easy to find
on the web and are relatively cheap. Some countries have gone as far as to ban the sale
of such devices. It is speculated that the GPS system for an entire city could be prevented
from working properly in a flash if the jamming device was sufficiently powerful. To put
this into perspective, a device the size of a suitcase could be used from as much as 1000
meters away [16].
GPS Spoofing
GPS spoofing it a more complex type of attack compared to blocking and jamming. It
does not block the normal satellite signal but modifies it in such a way to fool the receiver
into computing a different erroneous navigation/time solution. The receiver will not be
aware of the problem, and therefore it will operate thinking the genuine signal is still
being used. This attack can be much harder to detect than jamming.
Some work has already been done in designing spoofing attacks in general [17] [18].
GPS spoofers are also more and more accessible both in terms of cost and of the know-
how needed to build them. The manner in which this attack works gives the adversary
an extended list of possibilities when it comes to the damage that can be caused. Due to
the ”ease of use” and the disastrous results that GPS spoofing can have, some effort is
being put into researching, developing and deploying GPS receivers and countermeasures
in general, which can cope with these attacks [19] [20].
GPS Software
GPS Software attacks have been recently described [21]. They give the possibility of
altering any part of the satellite signal. This can lead to not only the receiver to give
an incorrect navigation/time solution, but can even make the receiver crash or downright
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become unusable (by exploiting a vulnerability in the executing programs). The fact that
manufacturers continue to add features like more connectivity options or even the ability
to manage the receiver through the internet, just adds to the problem. GPS as a protocol
has limitations from a security standpoint and adding more attack vectors waiting to be
exploited does not help to solve the problem.
The attacks demonstrated in [21] show that even high-end GPS receivers can be
damaged beyond repair just by modifying a simple parameter in the GPS signal. Again
these kinds of attacks are borderline impossible to detect considering the capabilities of
the adversary.
2.3 Precision Time Protocol
The precision time protocol appeared as a result of the growing need for high precision
time keeping. It was first described in the IEEE 1588-2002 standard, officially entitled
“IEEE Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Network Measure-
ment and Control Systems”. A revised version appeared in 2008 as the IEEE 1588-2008
standard [22]. It was designed to fill in the gap left open by the Network Time Protocol
(NTP) and GPS. It offers far better accuracy than NTP, but without the need for a dedi-
cated GPS receiver at each network node. GPS receivers can be used in combination with
a PTP network by acting as a Grandmaster Clock, i.e., the time source for that network.
A simple PTP network can be seen in [Figure 2.3]. It is composed of a Grandmaster
Clock that is the time source for the network; a Boundary Clock that synchronizes itself
to this Grandmaster Clock and then further synchronizes other parts of the network; and
lastly an Ordinary Clock. Since a PMU uses a GPS receiver to synchronize its local
clock, it can be thought of as being made up of a Grandmaster Clock (GPS receiver)
directly connected to a Boundary Clock.
Grandmaster 
Clock
Network 1
Boundary 
Clock
Network 2
Ordinary 
Clock
Typically a GPS 
receiver
M S M S
PMU
Figure 2.3: Simple PTP Network (M/S means that the communication port acts as
master/slave).
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2.3.1 PTP Devices
PTP uses the master-slave architecture for time distribution in which one or more com-
munication media are used and one or more clocks. It defines different roles for every
clock in the network and various states for every communication port in use:
• Grandmaster Clock : is a clock that synchronizes directly to a GPS receiver. It
always runs in PTP master mode, meaning it will distribute its time throughout the
network;
• Ordinary Clock : is a normal clock that synchronizes itself to another source. It
always runs in the PTP slave mode;
• Boundary Clock : is a clock that both synchronizes itself to a PTP master (acting
as a PTP slave) and further distributes the time to another part of the network (acting
as a PTP master). Only the PTP slave port of the Boundary Clock has the ability
to change the internal clock. The other ports can only read the local clock;
• Transparent Clock : is a special type of clock that modifies all PTP messages that
pass through this device, correcting the message timestamps for time spent travers-
ing the network equipment. This scheme improves the time distribution accuracy
by compensating for the time messages spend in each communication device (e.g.,
a switch).
2.3.2 Message Exchange
The synchronization is achieved by exchanging PTP messages between the master port
of a clock and the slave port of another clock. The messages are divided into event mes-
sages and general messages. Event messages are timestamped with both transmission and
reception times. A message is accurately timestamped in two ways: either on-the-fly as
it is about to leave the device (called one-step mechanism), or by transmitting another
message afterwards containing the timestamp for the first one (called two-step mecha-
nism). Only the Sync message and the Pdelay Resp message are affected by the used of
the two-step mechanism. For the Sync message, a Follow Up message is transmitted con-
taining it’s egress time. For the Pdelay Resp message, a Pdelay Resp Follow Up message
is transmitted containing it’s egress time. General messages do not require accurate times-
tamps and are used for both synchronization and configuration purposes. All messages
are shown in [Table 2.1].
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Based on timestamps, the slave calculates the time offset from the master clock and
eventually adjusts its local time to be similar to the master. The basic synchronization
message exchange is showed in [Figure 2.4] and the logic behind it is explained below:
information@tekroninternational.com | www.tekroninternational.com 
PTP Overview
PTP Operation 
IEEE 1588 standardises the Precision Time Protocol (PTP). It defines the descriptors that characterise a 
clock, the states of a clock and the allowed state transitions. It defines network messages, fields and
semantics, the datasets maintained by each clock and the actions and timing for all IEEE 1588 network and 
internal events. It also describes a suite of messages used for monitoring the system, specifications for an
Ethernet-based implementation and conformance requirements and gives some implementation 
suggestions. 
Message-Based Synchronisation 
PTP is based upon the transfer of network datagrams to determine system properties and to convey time 
information. A delay measurement principle is used to determine path delay, which is then accounted for in
the adjustment of local clocks. At start up, a master/slave hierarchy is created using what is called the Best 
Master Clock (BMC) algorithm to determine which clock has the best source of time. The BMC algorithm is
then run continuously to quickly adjust for changes in network configuration. Synchronisation is achieved 
using a series of message transactions between master and slaves. There are five message types - Sync, 
Delay Request, Follow Up, Delay Response and Management - which are used for all aspects of the 
protocol. A sequence of message transactions takes place to synchronise a pair of clocks as shown in
Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Master-Slave offset measurement 
MS
SM
Figure 2.4: PTP Message Exchange.
1. The master sends a Sync Message to the slave and saves the time t1 at which it was
transmitted;
2. The slave receives the Sync Message and notes the time of reception t2;
3. The master conveys to the slave the timestamp t1 by embedding it in a Follow Up
Message. Alternatively this timestamp can be embedded into the Sync Message
using some kind of hardware processing (this is called the one-step mechanism);
4. The slave sends a Delay Req Message to the master and saves the time t3 at which
it was transmitted;
5. The master receives the Delay Req Message and notes the time of reception t4;
6. The master conveys to the slave the timestamp t4 by embedding it in a Delay Resp
Message.
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Type Message Description
Event
Sync
Sent by the master. Contains the egress time
of the master node
Delay Req
Sent by the slave as a response to the Sync message.
Contains the egress time of the slave node
Pdelay Req
Used to measure the link delay between two clock
ports implementing the peer delay mechanism
Pdelay Resp
Used to measure the link delay between two clock
ports implementing the peer delay mechanism
General
Announce Contains the clock characteristics like clock quality
Follow Up
Delivers the master egress time of the Sync message.
Only used in the two-step mechanism
Delay Resp
Sent by the master node. It contains ingress time
of the Delay Req message
Pdelay Resp Follow Up
Used to measure the link delay between two clock
ports implementing the peer delay mechanism
Management Used for configuration purposes
Signaling Used for configuration purposes
Table 2.1: PTP Message types.
2.3.3 Network Delay and Clock Offset
Considering that the clock offset of the slave relative to the master is ∆ and that the
network delay between the master and slave is d(MS) and between the slave and master is
d(SM) we have:
t2 = t1 + ∆ + d(MS) (2.1)
t4 = t3−∆ + d(SM) (2.2)
Notice that we have two equations and three unknowns, which prevents us from
solving this system of equations. Packets transmitted throughout the network generally
suffer different delays in the two directions, and typically there is no way of accurately
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measuring the one way delay, i.e., d(MS) or d(SM). However, in order to solve these
equations an important assumption needs to be made: the network packet delay is the
same in both directions i.e., d(MS)=d(SM)=d. This is an approximation that introduces
an error in the calculations, as it is unlikely to hold in a real network. PTP tries to minimize
its effect in different ways, such as by taking very accurate timestamps, and by correcting
the timestamps when messages go through Transparent Clocks (see Section 2.3.1). Now
we can simplify (2.1) and (2.2):
d =
t2− t1 + t4− t3
2
∆ = t2− t1− d
It is now possible to calculate both the one way delay as well as the clock offset
∆. However, because of the aforementioned assumption, the calculated clock offset will
have an error that is equal to the difference between the mean delay and the master to
slave delay.
There are three main reasons that can lead to asymmetric path delays:
• Operating system latency. This is represented by time the PTP packet spends in
the protocol stack. Between the generation of the packet and its transmission on
the wire, the packet is manipulated and buffered by the protocol stack. When it
reaches the other side, it is delayed by another interrupt. To avoid this problem,
PTP packets should be timestamped as close to the physical layer as possible, e.g.,
at the MAC layer. This approach can reduce the latency introduced by the operating
system from milliseconds to nanoseconds.
• Asymmetric link speed. More often than not different links are used for bidirec-
tional communication. Two different links almost never have the same exact speed.
This can cause some packets to be received sooner than others, which in turn leads
to an error in the final calculation of the clock offset. In order to avoid this, the
same link has to be used for both directions.
• Network devices. All network devices (e.g., switches and routers) need to do some
kind of processing on the packets they receive. No matter what technique is used,
buffering and queuing packets takes time, which increases the delay. To try to
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minimize the impact that network devices have on network delay, various methods
were devised. The simplest method is to give more priority to the PTP packets.
The majority of switches and routers nowadays support packet prioritization. This
will alleviate the delay introduced by packet processing. In order to completely
eliminate this processing delay, a Transparent Clock can be used. The Transparent
Clock compensates for the processing time of the packet by changing the included
timestamp.
Another method to try to reduce the impact of asymmetric path delays is PTP delay
equalization [23] [24]. It appoints a fixed delay to all PTP packets. All network devices
would process the PTP packet as to make sure that all of them experience the same known
delay.
2.3.4 Best Master Clock Algorithm
In a distributed environment, an algorithm called Best Master Clock algorithm is used
to select the best candidate node to serve as the time source. This node will provide
the reference time for the network. Selecting the best master takes into account various
parameters of each node:
• Clock quality - is the expected deviation from real time. In version 2 of PTP, the
clock quality is defined with two data fields, the clockAccuracy and clockClass. The
clockClass is used for transitioning a port from one state into another in our imple-
mentation. By default the values 13, 255 and 248 are used to designate a master
only port, a slave only port or a master/slave port respectively. The master/slave
port can run in either of these states. In a network of such clocks only one will be
master and the rest will be slaves. The BMC algorithm is used to decide which one
should be the master. If all clocks are run in master only mode, after the best one is
selected, all others will go into a passive state;
• Priority - is represented by two 8-bit fields known as Priority1 and Priority2;
• Variance - is an estimation of the stability of the clock based on performance ob-
servations;
• Identifier - is a universally unique numeric identifier of the clock and is used as a
tie breaker if all the other parameters are the same.
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Each clock uses an internal data set to save its own parameters and Announce mes-
sages are used to send this information from the current best clock (current master) to all
other connected clocks. Whenever a Announce message arrives at a node, a comparison
is made between the internal parameters of the receiving clock and the data set included
in the Announce message. After this, a decision is made best on the data set comparison.
As such the Best Master Clock algorithm can be divided into two phases:
• Data set comparison phase. In this phase the proprieties of two different clocks are
compared, as indicated by their respective data sets. The input is represented by
data set contained in the received Announce message and the internal data set of
the clock that received that Announce message. The output is which one of the two
clocks is the most suited to take the role of master.
• State decision phase. After the data set comparison ends, a decision needs to be
made as to what is the most recommended state of the internal clock. If the other
clock from the comparison is better, the internal clock becomes a slave (or goes into
a passive state). Otherwise it becomes the master.
2.3.5 PTP security
Annex K of the Precision Time Protocol standard IEEE 1588-2008 [22] presents several
security guidelines that can help the protocol withstand different types of attacks. The
guidelines are however completely optional and in an experimental state. They focus on
adding two main security mechanisms:
• An integrity protection mechanism, which uses a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) to verify that messages have not suffered any unauthorized modification in
transit. A message counter is also implemented to help prevent replay attacks;
• An authentication method based on a challenge-response mechanism.
A flag in the PTP message is used to indicate that it is carrying security related infor-
mation. Each message following this one is required to also present the same flag or else
it is silently discarded without wasting any more resources. In order to ease this process
for hardware implementations, the flag field should be the last field in the message. By
doing this, an indirect protection against Denial of Service attacks on system resources is
created. In [25] a comprehensive threat analysis of the PTP protocol is done and solutions
using IPsec and MACsec are explored.
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Chapter 3
Fault Tolerant PTP
At the time of this writing, PTP has already been researched as a solution for time syn-
chronization in the smart grid environment. However, the main concern of these studies
is the clock synchronization accuracy that can be achieved. The security problems of this
protocol have yet to be addressed. In this chapter we present a new approach to employ
PTP in a smart grid environment. We also discuss the changes to the PTP standard that
address the lack of security, when the primary attack vectors are the GPS receivers.
3.1 Overview
Some of the challenges of deploying PTP in a smart grid network are similar to those
presented in [26]. Our solution is based on a PTP Boundary Clock [Figure 3.1]. It syn-
chronizes directly to a Grandmaster Clock and then distributes this time information to a
part of the network.
PTP 
Slave
PTP 
Master
Internal Clock
Grandmaster 
Clock Slave Clock
Figure 3.1: Boundary Clock as originally defined by PTP.
Our modified Boundary Clock [Figure 3.2] acts like a normal Boundary Clock but
has an additional port that functions as a backup in the case the Grandmaster Clock fails.
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Figure 3.2: Boundary Clock with the proposed modification.
The backup port takes the role of the PTP master once the node identifies misbehavior of
the Grandmaster Clock, ensuring that the internal clock remains synchronized with real
time. This backup port will be connected with other such ports from various Boundary
Clocks around the network. To ensure full time synchronization among all nodes, we need
to have several GPS based Grandmaster Clocks and Boundary Clocks spread throughout
the network to ensure some geographical distribution. However, if the network delays and
jitter allow it, we can use the same GPS receiver for more than one node. Not only does
our solution potentially manage to reduce the number of GPS receivers needed but it also
supports the detection and mitigation of GPS attacks. This enables the node to always
synchronize itself to a time source even if it is not as good (or precise) as the original.
3.2 Attack Model
Our focus is on detecting and mitigating attacks on the GPS receiver (i.e., Grandmaster
Clock) that offers time information to the boundary clock as well as on the communi-
cation link between them. There is an initial prerequisite that all boundary clocks are
synchronized to a correct time source before any attacks occur.
Fault tolerance represents one of the most important concepts in distributed systems
design. It enables a computer system to continue operating normally even when one
or more of its components fails. This does not imply that the failures do not have any
consequence on the system. The computational cost of maintaining the system running
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correctly in this case is directly proportional to the number of failures the system is suf-
fering. However, in systems with a high degree of fault-tolerance the impact of failures
on performance can be eliminated entirely.
We are interested in two main types of failures: crash and arbitrary. Crash failures
are self-explanatory. When a system crashes it is unable to continue providing the ser-
vice it was initially intended to offer. Arbitrary failures encompass all sort of erroneous
behaviors that the component might experience, including delays in producing responses
or the transmission of invalid results. Arbitrary failures are also called Byzantine failures
referencing the Byzantine Generals Problem [27].
We abstracted the ways in which the Grandmaster Clock can fail into two classes, as
perceived by the Boundary Clock:
• Crash failures are observed when the Grandmaster Clock is incapable of sending
any type of information to the Boundary Clock. This can happen when the GPS
receiver of the Grandmaster Clock is:
– under a Blocking or Jamming attack and loses its satellite signal lock;
– under a Software Attack that crashes the GPS receiver;
• Byzantine failures are assumed when the information received from the Grand-
master Clock is incorrect in any way, or when it reaches the Boundary Clock late or
in an arbitrary order. This can happen when the GPS receiver of the Grandmaster
Clock is:
– under a Spoofing Attack that causes the Grandmaster Clock to give usable but
incorrect data;
– under a Software Attack that renders the Grandmaster Clock unable to provide
any kind of usable information.
A Byzantine fault is also assumed when the Communication Link interconnecting
the Grandmaster Clock to the Boundary Clock is under attack, which in turn causes
the time information to be delayed or to reach the Boundary Clock in an incorrect
order.
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3.3 System Architecture
We define three new port states based on the existing three states of PTP Master, PTP
Passive and a PTP Slave. The new port states are called Fault-Tolerant (FT) PTP Master,
FT PTP Passive and FT PTP Slave respectively [see Figure 3.3]. As previously mentioned,
our modified Boundary Clock distinguishes itself from a normal one by the presence of
one extra port that will interconnect various such Boundary Clocks.
• FT PTP Slave has the purpose to detect abnormal activity coming from the Master
port it is connected to (in our case this will be the Grandmaster Clock port) and to
alert the backup port. It does this by analyzing the time information coming from
the Grandmaster Clock, as well as the network delay between them;
• FT PTP Master and FT PTP Passive are port states in which the newly added
backup port of the Boundary Clock will run. Their primary purpose is to distribute
time information (if the Grandmaster Clock where it synchronizes itself is still con-
sidered correct) to other Boundary Clocks.
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Figure 3.3: System Architecture.
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The normal PTP Slave port of the Boundary Clock is replaced with a FT PTP Slave.
As mentioned before, the backup port of the Boundary Clock will either run in FT PTP
Master or FT PTP Passive modes. A modified version of the Best Master Clock algorithm
runs between the backup ports with the responsibility of deciding which one is the FT
PTP Master. After the best FT PTP Master is selected, all the other ports will go into
FT PTP Passive mode. The modified version of the BMC algorithm takes into account
another parameter used for disqualifying one such port from the algorithm (see below).
3.4 Solution
In this section we describe how the detection and recovery mechanism works. The state
of the Boundary Clock during normal operation and when under attack are displayed in
[Figure 3.4] and [Figure 3.5].
FT PTP 
Slave
PTP 
Master
FT PTP 
Master
Internal Clock
FT PTP 
Passive
Grandmaster 
Clock Slave Clock
Under Attack
Figure 3.4: Boundary Clock state during normal operation.
When an attack is detected by the FT PTP Slave, it first does a clock jump1 of 2 *
DEFAULT SYNC INTERVAL (1 second in our implementation) ahead, then proceeds to
disable itself. The backup port (running in either FT PTP Master or FT PTP Passive)
observes the clock jump by reading the clock at each full run of the protocol. Next, it
goes into a normal PTP Slave mode. Any out of the ordinary modifications to the internal
clock of the Boundary Clock are detected and handled in this way.
The backup port can be in two different states when an attack is discovered: FT PTP
Master or FT PTP Passive. As mentioned, in both cases the backup port will go into PTP
1A sudden change in the order of milliseconds or larger of the internal clock time.
Chapter 3. Fault Tolerant PTP 28
Disabled PTP Master
PTP Slave
Internal Clock
FT PTP 
Master
Grandmaster 
Clock Slave Clock
Clock Jump
Detect Clock 
Jump
Under Attack
Figure 3.5: Boundary Clock state after an attack was detected.
Slave mode. The difference consists in the fact that if the current state is FT PTP Master,
another backup port will need to be elected to go into FT PTP Master state. A modified
BMC algorithm is used to perform this change, by comparing data from all the backup
ports of the Boundary Clocks.
Notice that we use the local clock of the Boundary Clock as a means to communicate
failure detection between the two ports. This is done in order to minimize changes to the
standard. In alternative, a low level, high speed communication scheme as presented
in [28] could help with the recovery time.
The clock jump performed by the FT PTP Slave will always have to be greater than
the DEFAULT SYNC INTERVAL. This is done to make sure that the backup port (now in
PTP Slave state) will receive at least one Sync Message from the new time source (in this
case the backup port who was elected as the new FT PTP Master from another boundary
clock) to compare the origin timestamp from this Sync Message to the current local clock
time.
The state change from FT PTP Master to PTP Slave is carried out by modifying
the clock class value of this port from 13 (associated with a Master only port) to 255
(Slave only port). Once into PTP Slave mode this port will start synchronizing to the
FT PTP Master and the previously set local clock jump will be immediately detected and
corrected. In the worst case scenario the recovery time is DEFAULT SYNC INTERVAL +
PTP Slave Initialization Time.
Next we describe in more detail how the detection mechanism implemented in the
FT PTP Slave works for crash and Byzantine faults.
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3.4.1 Crash failure detection
The crash failure detection mechanism is based on the periodic transmission of Announce
Messages. The normal behavior of the Grandmaster Clock is to send an Announce Mes-
sage every DEFAULT ANNOUNCE INTERVAL (1 second in our implementation). The
FT PTP Slave keeps track of the received announce messages and waits a maximum of
announceTimeoutGracePeriod (with a value of 3 seconds) before declaring a packet as
lost. We consider the Grandmaster clock failed if two Announce Messages are lost. This
translates to a maximum wait time of 6 seconds, which is a lot but serves as a means of
testing and verifying the algorithm. Of course, the bounds could be made tighter but with
the cost of an increased performance overhead.
3.4.2 Byzantine failure detection
As a first detection layer, all information reaching the Boundary Clock from the Grand-
master Clock is filtered to eliminate any bogus data. This will prevent most arbitrary
behaviors that cause the transmission of unexpected data. From the previously mentioned
attacks, the only one that can do this is the GPS Software attack. This scenario encom-
passes most of the attack vectors but two cases need to be treated separately because of
their volatile nature:
• Attacks on time. In this type of attack the goal is to try to provide inaccurate
time information to the Boundary Clock to desynchronize it. The primary informa-
tion used to detect these attacks comes from Sync Messages. An attack can occur
in two different ways: either the provided time value jumps forward by a signif-
icant amount in one step (clock jump), or the clock is skewed2 gradually step by
step. In order to detect both types, we save the values of the clock offset between
the Grandmaster Clock and the Boundary Clock after the clocks are synchronized
(Original offset), and the offset calculated in the last execution cycle of the al-
gorithm, which is based on the latest received Sync Message. We know that the
values will vary very little considering that clocks are already synchronized (pre-
requisite). So, if an attacker tries to jump the clock this will be discovered by
comparing the original offset with every new calculated offset. The values used to
define the maximum allowed offsets are: MAX SECONDS ALLOWED OFFSET,
and MAX ALLOWED DRIFT (in ns). The first one is used to detect offset jumps
2A change in the order of µs or slower relative to the internal clock time.
Chapter 3. Fault Tolerant PTP 30
in the order of seconds. The second one is employed to either find clock jumps
by comparing the last known offset with the newly calculated one, or to discover
skews by comparing the original offset with the newly calculated one. Special
care needs to be given to the MAX ALLOWED DRIFT parameter because it rep-
resents the maximum value that the Boundary Clock time is allowed to change
at each execution cycle. If an attack increases the clock offset at a rate slower
than the MAX ALLOWED DRIFT parameter, time data from other backup ports
can be used to detect it. Two maximum offset values were used because time is
represented by two fields (seconds and subseconds field) in our implementation.
The MAX SECONDS ALLOWED OFFSET and MAX ALLOWED DRIFT param-
eters need to be adjusted by measuring and averaging the clock offset and network
delays between the Grandmaster Clock and Boundary Clock.
In order to detect clock skews smaller than the MAX ALLOWED DRIFT value we
could make use of the communication link between the different backup ports to
exchange time information. In this scenario the backup port would need to be in
either FT PTP Master or a newly defined state. The objective of this new state would
be to measure the clock offset of the internal clock compared to other Boundary
Clocks. It could even make use of a secondary internal clock of the Boundary
Clock that would be inaccessible by any other means. Only this new state of the
backup port would have the ability to modify this secondary clock. This is a Master-
Slave scheme similar to the normal PTP where the new state would be responsible
for disciplining (modifying the clock in such a way as to synchronize it’s time
with another clock) the second clock. This new clock would give us the ability to
detect even the smallest of skews (even the drift values) to the first internal clock.
The problem is that there is no way of detecting if the Master (in this case, the
backup port running in FT PTP Master from another Boundary Clock) is under
attack. This means that time attacks consisting of skewing the clock slower than the
defined MAX ALLOWED DRIFT would only work on the Boundary Clock whose
backup port runs in FT PTP Master. This is still a huge improvement over having
no protection at all. Further work can be done to test and evaluate the validity of this
approach because it depends highly on the network conditions of communication
link between the Boundary Clocks.
• Attacks on the communication link. As previously mentioned the attacker has
total control over the communication link between the Grandmaster Clock and the
Boundary Clock. This allows him to delay or drop PTP packets. Dropped packets
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will make the Boundary Clock think the Grandmaster Clock has crashed, causing
the usual recovery actions to be performed.
Delay detection is done in a similar way to the detection of attacks on time but using
the network delay as primary information. The delay is calculated by means of the
standard delay request-response mechanism [Section 2.3]. Once again we save the
first calculated delay value after the clocks are synchronized and the one computed
in the last cycle of the algorithm. The main difference consists in the fact that net-
work delays can vary more than the clock offset. Therefore, instead of immediately
considering the Grandmaster Clock failed, we consider deviations from the normal
delay to be outliers. For a delay value to be considered an outlier it has to be greater
than MAX OUTLIER DEVIATION (in ns). When a sufficient number of outliers
(MAX DELAY OUTLIERS) are detected over a period of time, the Boundary Clock
will consider the Grandmaster Clock failed and act accordingly.
3.4.3 Modified Best Master Clock Algorithm
As previously mentioned the Best Master Clock algorithm is used to select the clock that
is most suited to distribute time information throughout the network. Announce messages
carry information that describes a clock state and quality. As such all clocks use an
internal data set to save their own attributes and compare it to the received data set from
the Announce message.
Our modification consists in the addition another parameter called isCandidate that
is verified at each run of the algorithm. This parameters is used to indicate that a clock
is no longer suitable for being a master. This happens when a backup port of a Boundary
Clock has detected an attack and goes into slave mode. In addition to the internal data
set of the clock, the isCandidate parameters of all the participating clocks also need to be
saved internally.
Announce messages only matter when they carry information about the current best
clock. The isCandidate parameter however has to be verified independently of the state
in which a clock is. This happens because even a clock in FT PTP Passive state can fail
and needs to be disqualified. Under normal circumstances this would not happen.
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Chapter 4
Implementation and Experimental
Evaluation
To evaluate the feasibility of our solution, a prototype was implemented based on a
software-only open-source implementation of PTP. The main goal was to evaluate and
measure the performance impact of the changes we have made to the PTP standard. The
results of our experimental tests are presented in last part of this chapter, where they
demonstrate an added capability for the detection of failures.
4.1 Implementation
The open source ptpd2 [10] was used as a base for our implementation. It was chosen
because it is specifically tailored to be used as a software only implementation [29] with-
out any hardware assistance. In [Figure 4.1] we present a UML diagram explaining the
structure of the software. Note that the diagram does not represent all the components of
ptpd2 (e.g., it excludes the NTP failover component of ptpd2 that kicks in when no time
sources are available for synchronization) but rather those that have been of interest to us.
The first thing that happens when the ptpd2 software starts up is the creation of the
two main data structures of the protocol: a RunTimeOpts structure and a PtpClock struc-
ture. The first one is used to save the immutable initialization parameters of the protocol.
This data structure is passed as argument to the classes whenever something needs to be
initialized or verified. The second data structure, the PtpClock, is a representation of a
PTP port. It is used to save information about the current running instance of ptpd2.
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Ptpd.c
RunTimeOpts   rtOpts
main
PtpClock           G_ptpClock
Startup.c
ptpdStartup
checkSignals
catchSignals
ptpdShutdown
writeLockFile
dump_cmd_line_parameters
daemonconfig.c
loadCommandLineOptions
loadDefaultSettings
loadConfigurationFile
parseConfig
printHelp
protocol.c
doInit
toState
doState
addForeign
protocol
updateDatasets
issue* (All message types)
handle* (All message types)
processMessage
Servo.c
initClock
updateDelay
updateClock
updateOffset
updatePtpEngineStats
sys.c
adjFreq
getTime
adjTime
displayStatus
nanoSleep
setKernelUtcOffset
bmc.c
initData
bmcDataSetComparison
bmc
bmcStateDecision
m1
p1
s1
Configuration 
File
START
Command Line 
Arguments
OS Signals
timer.c
constants.h
Display.c
msg.c
arith.c
net.c
netInit
netSendGeneral
netInitTimestamp
netRecvGeneral
netSendEvent
netRecvEvent
netShutdown
Network 
Interface
System Clock
datatypes.h
Figure 4.1: Ptpd2 class diagram.
After this step, the configuration file and command line arguments are read by the
daemonconfig class. It is at this point that alot of verifications are made about the validity
of the input parameters. If everything is fine the daemonconfig class passes this informa-
tion to the Startup class which will initialize the RunTimeOpts data structure and allocate
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the necessary memory for the PtpClock data structure (ptpdStartup method). Some pa-
rameters regarding the operating system kernel and platform are also initialized in the
PtpClock data structure at this point.
Before the protocol starts, a lock is put on the currently running instance of the soft-
ware, by creating a lock file, as to block concurrency issues that may arise with having
multiple instances of ptpd2 changing the internal clock at the same time. Ptpd2 does not
yet support Boundary Clocks per se, because of the way that the PtpClock data structure
was constructed. However, we managed to workaround this by running two instances of
the software with different locks for each instance. This allowed for the creation of a
Boundary Clock. Great care needs to be taken with this approach to avoid concurrency
problems. In our case, only one of the ports will be allowed to change the value of the
internal clock at a given time, but both can read it simultaneously.
Next, the main loop of the protocol is started (the protocol method of the protocol.c
class). The first thing that happens is the data initialization of the main PtpClock structure
with parameters from the constants.h file as well as the runtime parameters from the
RunTimeOpts data structure. This is done only once, when the protocol starts, by the
doInit method.
Next we describe the roles of each of the classes included in the class diagram:
• datatypes.h: contains the definition of all the data structures used by the protocol;
• timer.c: defines the concept of timer for the protocol. Timers are used when wait-
ing for network PTP messages to arrive. This allows for the detection of dropped
packets;
• constants.h: defines the default initialization values for various data structures used
by the protocol;
• Display.c: implements the general rules of representing data both to the standard
output console and to log files;
• arith.c: consists of time format conversion routines and additional math functions
needed by the protocol;
• msg.c: is used for message packing and unpacking for network transmission. It
contains individual packing and unpacking methods for each defined message type;
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• net.c: is the class used for network communication. It is responsible for network
discovery, packet timestamping and netowrk packet transfer. When packets reach
this phase they are ready/packed for network transmission. This class represents
the lowest level of message timestamping available in software implementations of
the PTP standard. In order to improve accuracy, packets can be timestamp at the
physical layer by the Network Interface itself in hardware assisted or hardware only
implementation of the PTP standard;
• bmc.c: implements the BMC algorithm. It divides the implementation into two
parts as explained in Section 2.3.4: the data set comparison phase (implemented in
the bmcDataSetComparison method) and the state decision phase (implemented in
the bmcStateDecision method). The initData method runs only when the protocol
starts for the first time and is responsible for initializing all the PtpClock run-time
parameters that are used in the BMC comparison (see Section 2.3.4). The last three
methods m1, p1 and s1 are used to copy the data sets (received in an Announce
message) into the local PtpClock when a state change occurs. m1, p1 and s1 are
used when the local PtpClock goes into master, passive or slave port respectively.
• Servo.c: is the class responsible for disciplining the internal clock and calculating
the delay and offset. The whole process can be seen in 4.2 and is explained in more
detail in [29];
• sys.c: contains all the code to call the kernel time routines;
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engineering students at Case Western Reserve University over 
a period of approximately six months as part of an 
undergraduate senior project. 
B. Test and Measurement
PTPd is currently developed for Test and Measurement
(T&M) systems. For T&M devices (e.g., volt meters and 
thermocouple instruments), PTP provides time and frequency 
coordination for the time-stamping of acquired data, and PTP 
provides a common time-base for time-triggered data 
acquisition. 
 The needs of T&M systems significantly influence the 
current design of PTPd’s clock servo. Most notably, the servo 
is optimized for the stable network topology typical of test and 
measurement set-ups. 
C. Hardware Constraints
PTPd is a software-only system. It lacks two notable
systems found in hardware-supported implementations. First, 
PTPd uses software time stamps. It records message send and 
receive times in the software layers of the network stack rather 
than in the physical layer of the networking hardware (e.g., 
snooping the MII bus of an Ethernet PHY [2]). Second, PTPd 
uses a software clock. It adjusts the magnitude of the periodic 
increment of a time quantity stored in memory. However, 
PTPd was outfitted with a hardware clock for the tests 
included in this paper. This was done to allow the clock to be 
read with minimal jitter by isolating jitter in clock reads from 
jitter in clock coordination. 
 PTPd is intended for embedded computer platforms that 
have minimal computing resources. This includes platforms 
with sub-100MHz CPUs. The program’s CPU utilization is 
below 1% on a 66 MHz m68k processor, as observed by 
standard resource utilization monitors like the UNIX top 
utility. Also, PTPd does not require a Floating Point Unit 
(FPU), or FPU emulation, because it uses only fixed point 
arithmetic. Efficiency and limitation to fixed-point arithmetic 
are significant considerations in the design of the clock servo. 
D. Software Constraints
PTPd is currently ported to Linux. Most of the PTPd
system, including the protocol stack and the clock servo, runs 
as a background user-space process. This allows PTPd to 
“play nicely” in typical multi-task computing environments. 
PTPd relies on simple kernel-space routines for its timely 
components: the frequency adjustable clock and the message 
time stamps. 
PTPd interfaces with the kernel through standard Linux 
system calls. Receive time stamps are recorded in the Network 
Interface Card (NIC) driver, in or close to the receive interrupt 
handler. The receive time stamps are passed to user-space 
though an ioctl(). The receive time stamp mechanism is 
included in vanilla (unmodified) Linux version 2.4 and 2.6 
kernels. A similar send time stamp mechanism is not included 
in vanilla Linux kernels, but kernel send time stamps can be 
added to Linux with only small modifications. The entire 
modification typically amounts to less than ten lines of code. 
PTPd can operate acceptably without kernel send time stamps, 
but it performs better with the lower jitter afforded by kernel 
send time stamps, especially under heavy CPU loads. 
 PTPd uses the Linux kernel’s software clock along with 
the adjtimex() interface for clock tick-rate adjustment. 
Linux’s clock is an implementation of the hybrid kernel 
Phase-Locked Loop/Frequency-Locked Loop (PLL/FLL) 
designed by David Mills for the Network Time Protocol 
(NTP) project [3]. The interface provides many types of clock 
adjustments, including a self-tuning PLL servo; however, 
PTPd uses its own servo loop and relies on only 
adjtimex() frequency adjustment. This combination is 
effective because the user-space servo is efficient and is not 
sensitive to execution latency, and adjtimex() is accurate 
and responsive to rate adjustments. 
 Vanilla Linux is not a real time operating syste  (RTOS); 
therefore, it guarantees no bounds on in errupt servicing 
latencies. Both message receipts and clock ticks are interrupt 
driven events. Variations in interrupt latencies create jitter in 
the delay estimates that PTPd uses to coordinate clocks. Jitter 
presents the greatest challenge to precise time coordination, 
and it is the most significant consideration in the design of the 
clock servo. 
IV. CLOCK SERVO
A. Overview
Figure 1 is a diagram of PTPd’s clock servo. The diagram
from left to right shows the data path from the protocol to the 
clock. The protocol regularly samples the master-to-slave 
delay (cf. Equ tion (2.2)), a d it interm ttently samples the 
slave-to-master delay (cf. Equation (2.4)). Correspondingly, 
th  ffset from master is updated regularly, a d the o e-way 
delay is updat d intermittently. The figure show  the delay 
and Sync interval inputs, the offset and one-way delay 
calculations, the offset and one-way delay filters, and the PI 
controller that mediates the servo outp t. The output is a 
fractional tick-rate adjustment that disciplines the clock. 
Fig. 1. Clock Servo Diagram 
B. Design Parameters
Three characteristics were considered during the design
PTPd’s clock servo. First is the closed-loop response, 
including convergence and stability. The acceptable period of 
initial convergence is on the order of minutes, and the quantity 
tracked by the servo changes slowly. This allows convergence 
to be attained and maintained with conservative controller 
tuning, and conservative tuning largely eliminates stability 
concerns. 
 The second characteristic is time error. This represents the 
time-dependent applications that require two clocks to read the 
same time at any given point in time. An example of this 
requirement would be two systems that must take a 
measurement at precisely the same time. Another example 
would be two systems that must precisely measure the 
coincidence in time of two events. A useful metric of time 
coordination is the root-mean-square (RMS) time difference 
between clocks. 
 The third characteristic is rate error. This represents the 
time-dependent applications that require two clocks to 
progress at the same rate over a given period of time. An 
example of this requirement would be a system that measures 
the frequency content of a signal. It might seem that low rate 
error must follow implicitly from low time error, but this is 
not so. A servo design that minimizes time error may sacrifice 
rate error, and vice versa. This could occur with an 
aggressively tuned servo that tracks closely but with a lot of 
ringing, and the converse case could occur in a sluggishly 
Figure 4.2: Ptpd2 clock servo diagram.
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All the classes that we ended up modifying can be seen in 4.3 in red.
Ptpd.c
RunTimeOpts   rtOpts
main
PtpClock           G_ptpClock
Startup.c
ptpdStartup
checkSignals
catchSignals
ptpdShutdown
writeLockFile
dump_cmd_line_parameters
daemonconfig.c
loadCommandLineOptions
loadDefaultSettings
loadConfigurationFile
parseConfig
printHelp
protocol.c
doInit
toState
doState
addForeign
protocol
updateDatasets
issue* (All message types)
handle* (All message types)
processMessage
Servo.c
initClock
updateDelay
updateClock
updateOffset
updatePtpEngineStats
sys.c
adjFreq
getTime
adjTime
displayStatus
nanoSleep
setKernelUtcOffset
bmc.c
initData
bmcDataSetComparison
bmc
bmcStateDecision
m1
p1
s1
Configuration 
File
START
Command Line 
Arguments
OS Signals
timer.c
constants.h
Display.c
msg.c
arith.c
net.c
netInit
netSendGeneral
netInitTimestamp
netRecvGeneral
netSendEvent
netRecvEvent
netShutdown
Network 
Interface
System Clock
datatypes.h
Figure 4.3: Modified ptpd2 class diagram.
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Next we explain the most significant modifications that we made to every class:
• datatypes.h: three data structures were modified here:
– AnnounceMsg. We added a new parameter isCandidate. This parameter is
used to disqualify the backup port of a Boundary Clock from the modified
BMC algorithm.
– ForeignMasterRecord. This data structure is used to save information about
all other known PTP nodes. The isCandidate parameter was added as well as
a parameter to save the timestamp of the last received Sync message called
lastSyncTimestamp;
– PtpClock. Was modified to save parameters that are used for evaluation pur-
poses: isCandidate (representing the isCandidate value of the local clock);
previousDelay and previousTime that represent the internal clock time and de-
lay calculated in the last execution cycle of the protocol; originalTimeOffset
utilized for verification purposes, to disallow the clock to drift too far from its
master; delayOutliers is the number of detected delay outliers up until a cer-
tain point (see Section 3.4.2) and lastly lastSyncTimestamp is the timestamp
from the last received Sync message from the current master;
• constants.h: the default values for the attack detection tolerances are defined here.
The two variables that are used to activate/deactivate the attack detection mecha-
nism are also defined here: one for attacks that target time information (FT TIME)
and one for attacks on the network communication link (FT DELAY);
• protocol.c: contains most of our modifications. All the attack detection mechanisms
are verified here, at each run of the main loop;
• bmc.c: contains modifications that consist mostly of the verification of the new
isCandidate value. This is where this new parameter is copied to and from the
Announce message;
• Servo.c: allows for a master or passive port (originally they were never allowed to
go into slave mode by the configuration) to modify the internal clock. Normally
this can only be done by a slave port. However, we only allow a master or passive
port to do this if it has transitioned into a slave port. This is what happens to the
backup port of the Boundary Clock when an attack is detected.
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4.2 Testing Platform
For the testbed three off-the-shelf PC’s running Ubuntu 14.10 were used. One of the
machines was equipped with two network cards (one for the FT PTP Slave port and one
for the FT PTP Master/FT PTP Passive port) and played the role of the Boundary Clock.
The other two machines simulated a Grandmaster Clock (running a normal PTP Master)
and a second Boundary Clock with a backup FT PTP Master/FT PTP Passive port, to act
as a new time source when the first one fails. We did not simulate the other normal PTP
Master port of the second Boundary Clock and the network it synchronizes because it is
just a normal PTP network.
Since we used off-the-shelf PC machines, the internal oscillators of the clocks are
of low quality. If left unsynchronized, they drift apart by a large amount in a relatively
short span of time. This would not happen in a real smart grid network because the PMUs
oscillators are of a better quality. The test network was a normal 100 Mbps Ethernet LAN
with a lot of nodes, traffic and jitter. It is safe to assume that the network conditions in a
smart grid environment will be considerably better. However all nodes are relatively close
geographically, closer than in some deployment scenarios of a smart grid network.
4.3 Results
We experimented our algorithm in three test cases. Our first test case consisted in injecting
a Crash fault [Figure 4.4].
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Figure 4.4: Crash fault detection.
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This was simulated by simply killing the PTP process running on the Grandmaster
Clock machine. This was done at time ”08”. After exactly 6 seconds (as previously de-
scribed 2 * DEFAULT ANNOUNCE INTERVAL) the Grandmaster Clock was considered
failed. At that moment the FT PTP Slave port of the Boundary Clock increased the in-
ternal clock by 2 seconds and proceeded to disable itself. The FT PTP Master/FT PTP
Passive port now detects the clock skew and goes into PTP Slave mode. After receiv-
ing the first Sync message from a FT PTP Master port of another Boundary Clock the
synchronization process starts.
The second test case is an attack on time. This can happen in two ways: either by
skewing the clock or by jumping it a large amount at once. We present results for the
first case, which is harder to detect. The second case detection scheme is similar except
we compare the current local time to MAX SECONDS ALLOWED OFFSET instead of
MAX ALLOWED DRIFT. The results would also be similar because nothing else changes.
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Figure 4.5: Gradual Clock Skew.
A bash script was created and ran on the Grandmaster Clock machine. It will skew
the clock by a small amount by performing a small set of simple operations. The script
reads the value of the clock, saves this value into a variable then proceeds to set the clock
to the value of that variable. This works because it takes ' 1 ms to set a variable in
memory in our machines. [Figure 4.5] shows the perceived increase in the clock offset of
the Master (appearing on a logarithmic scale in the graph) that is suffering the attack (left
side of the graph) . The value for the MAX ALLOWED DRIFT parameter used for this
test was 700 µs.
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The last case we tested was when the attacker delays PTP packets sent by the Grand-
master Clock. The parameter MAX OUTLIER DEVIATION had the value of 300 µs and
the MAX DELAY OUTLIERS was set to 3. To simulate the delays, we employed the tc
command [30]. The tc command is used to show or manipulate traffic control settings.
This allowed us to introduce a 450 µs delay in the network.
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Figure 4.6: Clock offset during Delay Attack.
The clock offset perceived by the Boundary Clock is shown in [Figure 4.6]. We can
see that after recovery the clock offset start normalizing with even better accuracy than
while synchronizing with our simulated Grandmaster Clock. This happened because all
of our machine are experiencing almost the same network conditions. In a real smart
grid environment the perceived clock offset after recovery will always be greater than the
initial offset.
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Figure 4.7: Packet Delay Attack.
After recovery, we can see from the graph [Figure 4.7] that the delays of the new
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communication link between the FT PTP Master/FT PTP Passive (now in PTP Slave state)
port of the Boundary Clock and a FT PTP Master port from another Boundary Clock are
not as stable as before the attack (where the Grandmaster Clock corresponding to the GPS
receiver was synchronizing the FT PTP Slave port (now disabled)). This is due to the fact
that the delays are calculated based on the clock offset and the first Boundary Clock is not
yet fully synchronized to the new time source. After some time they will normalize and
again become stable.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The evolving needs of the smart grid bring a new set of problems that has to be addressed.
Time synchronization in such an environment is a critical necessity. This requirements is
currently realized by the use of various GPS receivers, which creates a large attack surface
for attackers to exploit.
In this work, PTP was used as the primary building block for a novel solution. An
approach based on PTP was developed, taking the necessities of the power grid environ-
ment into consideration, while trying to keep the modifications to the standard protocol to
a minimum. This approach adds fault tolerant capabilities to a normal Boundary Clock as
well as the ability to detect attacks on the time source (GPS receiver) directly connected
to this Boundary Clock.
The solution managed to satisfy the time synchronization requirements and as an
added benefit it also mitigates all types of tested attacks on the primary network time
source (GPS receivers). In the case in which an attack is detected, another boundary
clock starts acting as the new time source for the current one while the synchronization to
the current GPS receiver time source is disabled.
The implementation of the solution was made on open-source code, namely the ptpd2
project, which is a software for version 2 of the PTP standard. Various Linux PCs were
used to test and evaluate the solution. In terms of network conditions we tried to emulate
a smart grid the best we could, however there are areas where our testbed differs from a
real world test case scenario. Some aspects of the testbed network are better than in a real
world smart grid (e.g., the geographical distance between nodes) while others are worse
(e.g., number of nodes producing traffic and amount of general network traffic).
The results show that this solution is successful at mitigating all types of attacks as
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long as our requirements are met.
In the case in which the Grandmaster Clock crashes, a recovery time of 6 seconds was
observed. After this, a new time source started being used. The second test case was an
attack on the time information provided by the Grandmaster Clock. Our solution managed
to detect and recover from this attack in≈ 2 seconds. We managed to observe an increase
in the clock offset after synchronizing to the new time source. This is representative of
a real world scenario. Lastly, we verified that delaying network packets coming from
the Grandmaster Clock is also detected. Each delayed packet is detected individually
and a threshold is put on the maximum number of packets that can be delayed before
the Grandmaster Clock is considered failed. The recovery time in this case is equal to
the aforementioned threshold. In our case, this parameter was set to 3, translating into a
recovery time of 3 seconds.
Further research can be performed to see how the protocol behaves in a real-world
smart grid environment, as well as the impact it has on specific parts of the network while
under attack.
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